China: Learning To Strike A Fine Balance
April 10, 2008
The Olympic torch saga in London and Paris proved to be an embarrassment for the Chinese who sent their grim looking paramilitaries to deal ruthlessly with anyone who dared stand in their way. Even Lord Seb Coe was heard to complain about their rough tactics. Who allowed China to send in these heavies and why? Expect the governments to claim that it was all in the name of the Olympic spirit and that politics have nothing to do with it. In reality, ever since the cricket and apartheid controversy in South Africa two decades ago everyone accepts now that sport and politics are actually two sides of the same coin. So was it wise to send the super fit ‘flame attendants’ to guard the torch?
It will probably surprise many people to discover that among the permanent members of the UN Security Council China has the second largest contingent of blue berets in trouble spots, just ahead of France. China is gradually adjusting to being a major player in the world. In the past Chinese foreign policy was dictated by communist ideology but after 1978 Deng Xiaoping laid down the new ground rules. Support of Maoist revolutionary groups was ditched and foreign policy making ceased to be ideologically based.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 China feared that the US’s agenda would come to dominate the world. Top of this agenda was the spread of democracy. But China’s experiments with democracy had led to the tragedy of Tiananmen Square in June 1989. Democracy was seen by Beijing as a virus which could produce social chaos and even lead to the breakup of the country. The Chinese leadership looked around for allies who would share its distaste for democracy, setting its sights on North Korea and Burma. In both countries bordering China the ruling regimes feared democracy as much as the Chinese.
The essence of Deng’s approach was to proceed cautiously, to bide one’s time and never claim leadership; in other words, diplomacy by stealth. The rapid expansion of the Chinese economy led to a rethink about this strategy in the late 1990s. Investment was directed into those states which were treated as pariahs by the Western world. In Africa, Sudan was top of Beijing’s list. The country was sitting on huge oil and gas reserves, ripe for development. Alongside Chinese state companies came military advisers and weapons. China now imports about two thirds of Sudan’s oil.
In 2001, China adopted a ‘go out’ strategy to promote Chinese investments in the developing world. Even though the Chinese government represses the Muslim minority in its own country, Iran was targeted. In 2004, Iran, already a major world supplier of oil, concluded an agreement with China for the export of $20 billion worth of natural gas annually for 25 years.
The discovery of a huge gas field off the south west coast of Burma in 2004 excited Beijing. The Chinese wanted the exploration rights and to build oil and gas pipelines from the Burmese coast to Yunnan and Sichuan, in southern China. Eventually a Chinese state company secured the oil and gas exploration rights even though an Indian consortium had initially outbid it. The Burma-China pipelines are of enormous strategic significance to China. At present, the major tanker route goes through the Malacca Straits, a strip of water between Malaysia and the Indonesian island of Sumatra. During a potential conflict these waters could be closed to international traffic.
In the past China used to support the Burmese Communist Party against the military junta but now it has switched sides. China is a major source of military training and weapons for the junta. Beijing is worried that a possible advent of democracy in Burma could transform the country into an American ally and jeopardise China’s dominant economic position there. India, extremely keen to buy Burma’s oil and gas, is also seen by the Chinese as a threat.
China accepts that the junta in Burma has to introduce reforms and become less confrontational in its relations with the UN and other international organisations. Beijing has quietly urged Rangoon to accommodate some of the aspirations of the many ethnic groups. The Chinese convened in Kunming a meeting of the various armed resistance groups and encouraged them to lay down their arms. Members of the democratic opposition in Burma have met for discussions, hosted by the Chinese. In July 2007, China arranged a meeting between the US and Burmese governments in Beijing.
The riots in Burma in late 2007 and the harsh crackdown embarrassed the Chinese. Their policy of gradually pushing Rangoon towards less repression suffered a setback. However, Beijing did not want a democratic revolution in Burma so it continued to tread a cautious path in supporting the junta. China wants the regime in Rangoon to follow a policy of economic reform while retaining political power. There is no evidence at present that this advice has any resonance among the military rulers, but Beijing is not giving up.
Like Burma, another ‘problem child’ for China is North Korea. The Chinese played an important role in helping the US and others to negotiate an end the country’s nuclear ambitions. But yet again, China does not want to push the regime in North Korea too hard lest it collapses allowing American influence to spread north.
China’s diplomats have to tread very carefully. If they support American inspired UN resolutions they risk augmenting American influence throughout the world. If they remain obdurate and protect their partners, they risk facing growing opposition from the international community. China is fortunate that no democratic states border it: Russia, countries of Central Asia, Burma, Vietnam, North Korea all have authoritarian regimes with no desire to move to democracy. However, authoritarian states are all potentially unstable and China needs stability on its borders. That’s why its diplomats face a huge task of encouraging reform, first economic and then administrative, in order to ensure stability and at the same time avoid any political earthquakes.
Sending in the heavies to protect the Olympic flame was a mistake. Striking a fine diplomatic balance is what China needs to do in the future.
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